I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years of practical experience with the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") 1 have given students, scholars and politicians incentives to evaluate the effects of the treaty and to begin proposing possible amendments. The evaluations of NAFTA have come from the perspective of the three NAFTA Parties 2 and in multiple directions. 
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State arbitration process"), 4 which has been characterized as "the most innovative and […] controversial part of the entire agreement" 5 and "unprecedented". 6 As suggested by some authors, the distinctiveness lies in the fact that Chapter 11 and its DSM establishes substantive guarantees for the protection of foreign investment and an arbitral mechanism by which qualifying investors may seek damages for breach of those guarantees. Foreign investors may invoke the proceeding without the need of diplomatic protection or the consent of the State of the national. 7 The claims are adjudicated via mandatory arbitration under the modality of foreign investor versus host State. Inspired by the U.S. bilateral investment treaty model, this important chapter binds three different countries, two developed, Canada and the United States, and one developing, Mexico.
With mention of Chapter 11 mostly absent from the harsh public discourse during NAFTA's negotiations, 8 the arbitral award in Metalclad
9
-the first case under the DSM condemning a NAFTA Party for violation of a Chapter 11 provision -prompted a boom in the literature addressing NAFTA's investment protection and arbitration. 10 Since then, concepts such as "regulatory takings," 11 "international environmental regulation", 12 4
Contained in Section B of Chapter 11, establishes a mechanism by which investors may seek damages for breach of such guarantees. NAFTA supra note 1 Articles 1115 to 1137.
